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Abstract
The predicted prosperity of the Arctic has propelled countries to compete over
territory and natural resources lying beneath the water. There is no doubt that a huge
amount of potential natural resources in the disputed areas can cause significant
tensions between the countries. Therefore, this paper aims to assess the cooperation
and conflict dilemma in the Arctic. I examine the Barents Sea dispute and the
Beaufort Sea dispute as case studies to demonstrate the potential for cooperation in the
Arctic. I claim that the settlement of the Barents Sea dispute between Norway and
Russia gives important lessons on how to solve the Beaufort Sea dispute between the
United States and Canada. I will argue that cooperation, not conflict, will dominate
future relations in the Arctic region. Even though the right to the Arctic resources may
trigger conflict and rising tensions, we live in the increasingly interdependent world,
where cooperation is not an option, but rather an obligation. In addition, this thesis
will introduce the significance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea and its role in facilitating cooperation in the maritime boundary delimitation
issues. I believe that the Arctic region can bring states together to confront shared
challenges, solve common problems, and enjoy the benefits that the improved access
to the region‟s resources will bring.
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Chapter I
Introduction
There were times when the oceans, except a narrow belt of sea surrounding a
nation‟s coastline, belonged to no one and were free for everyone. However, now, in
the twenty-first century, the proliferation of claims over the extension of offshore
resources is evident. The tension is rapidly growing among coastal countries. Recently
the melting ice in the North Pole prompted the dispute over the rights to the Arctic
Circle‟s territory and its natural resources. Five Arctic countries – Canada, Denmark,
Norway, Russia, and the United States are competing to maintain a presence not only
on the ocean‟s surface, but also claiming the rights to the resources under the water.1
The focus of this thesis is the settlement of the dispute in the Arctic Circle.
There are ample of reasons for the conflict over the rights to the territory in the
oceans. The resources of the sea are believed to be enormous. A few of the most
significant resources are fish stocks, oil, gas, gold and diamonds. Moreover, coastal
countries are concerned about the right to claim the strategic passages in the Arctic
Circle as part of their internal waters.2 In August 2, 2007, Russians planted the flag in
the Arctic seabed claiming their right to the territory. Even though physical
confrontation was avoided, other Arctic countries perceived the flag-planting
ceremony as an aggressive act, and an unnecessary provocation.3 Moreover, Russia is
delaying the ratification of an agreement reached with the United States concerning
the control of an area in the Bering Sea.4 Sovereignty conflicts, the desire to possess

1

Roger Howard, The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources (London
and New York: Continuum, 2009).
2
Ibid., 8-9.
3
Ibid., 6.
4
Lieutenant Colonel Alan L. Kollien, “Toward an Arctic Strategy” (MA thes., U.S. Army War College,
2009), 8.

4

large amounts of natural resources, and especially, the overlap of claims between
rivals, will inevitably lead to either confrontation or cooperation between countries.
The proliferation of territorial claims in the Arctic suggests the possibility of
intense national competition in this region. However, this paper is based on the
hypothesis that despite the vast amount of resources at stake, countries will prefer
cooperation rather than conflict in the Arctic Circle. In this thesis I intend to answer
such questions as: who are the key actors in the region? What are their interests?
Where and how do these interests overlap to give rise to conflict and rivalry? Can the
issue of competing interests be resolved through cooperation and dialogue in order to
achieve a mutually acceptable compromise? Specifically I will rely on two case
studies; one dealing with cooperation and the other dealing with ongoing dispute. I
will analyze how the agreement between Russia and Norway, over the Barents Sea,
was reached, what the consequences are, and what made both nations cooperate after
four decades of disagreements and inability to reach a compromise. In addition, I will
discuss if, or how the lessons from this boundary settlement between Norway and
Russian can be applied to the outstanding issue between the United States and Canada
in the Beaufort Sea.
In order to consistently answer my research questions and properly evaluate the
cooperation and conflict dilemmas, this thesis will be structured in separate chapters
addressing different issues. In the first chapter of this thesis, I intend to analyze the
importance of the issues in terms of two main international relations theories: realism
and liberalism. Both theories offer valuable explanations and very distinct insights
into a country‟s practice of international relations in the Arctic Circle.
Moreover, the significance of the cooperation or conflict needs to be viewed
through the lenses of the Arctic strategy documents. They will be analyzed in Chapter
5

I as well. Contents of such documents provide necessary information about each
country‟s interest and priorities in the region. This thesis intends to analyze how those
interests differ and in what way they are compatible? Therefore, I will examine and
compare the Arctic Strategy documents of Norway, the Russian Federation, Canada,
and the United States.
The second chapter of this thesis addresses the significance of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its applicability in the
Arctic region. The UNCLOS is an unprecedented attempt by international community
to regulate all aspects of the resources of the sea and the uses of the ocean. It defines
the rights and responsibilities of nations and their use of the world's oceans. It
indicates specific jurisdictional limits within which countries can exercise their
authority. This thesis examines whether the UNCLOS provisions offer the solution to
the disputed areas. In a situation, where rival claimants appear to have equally strong
claims (when the coasts of two states are opposite or adjacent to each other), the
UNCLOS indicates that the delimitation of borders should be affected by agreement
on the basis of international law, in order to achieve an equitable solution.5 Obviously,
the concept of equity is very flexible and subjective. This general rule leaves the
negotiating parties to decide on the method to be used in the settlement of
boundaries.6
The third chapter focuses on the resources in the Arctic and disputes over them.
It also discusses delimitation issues in the region and introduces delimitation methods
which are the key to divide territories.
5

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982), Article 74.
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Clive Archer, and David Scrivener, eds., Northern Waters: Security and Resource Issues (London:
Croom Helm, 1986), 170.
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Chapter four examines the Barents and Beaufort Sea disputes. I will claim that
the settlement of the Barents Sea dispute can guide Canada and the United States
towards a constructive resolution of the Beaufort Sea dispute. I believe that
uncertainty about the exact amount of resources and the issue of their recoverability
will prevent confrontations between countries. The proper exploration of the resources
is not possible until the agreements between the countries are reached and the
territories are divided or shared.
The last chapter sums up the cooperation/conflict dilemma in the Arctic and
suggests ways the Beaufort Sea dispute might be solved.
Theoretical Literature Review
Neorealism
Hans Morgenthau, a classical realist, would claim that states‟ interests are
defined in terms of power. Therefore, the dispute over the boarders would be viewed
as each country‟s wish to dominate in anarchical international system. Classical
realists view human nature as aggressive and conflicting. Thus, war over the disputed
borders would appear to be inevitable.
However, neorealists suggest that states actions are driven by the desire to
survive. As a result, tension between the countries is a consequence of survival issues.
Mearsheimer, as an offensive realist, claims that there are three patterns of behavior in
international system. Firstly, states fear each other. Secondly, states aim to guarantee
their own survival. Finally, states seek to maximize their relative power positions over
the other states. The greater the military advantage, the more secure it can feel.7 As
neorealists would suggest, all claimant countries perceive the disputed territory as a
7

John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 (3)
(1994): 11-12.
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source from which they can maximize their relative power. The world is seen as a
struggle for relative power, where the victor achieves a higher status among the other
units within the international community. Control over a certain territory in the Arctic
helps to maintain their influence in the region. Meanwhile, other countries may view
one country‟s claim to control the disputed territory as a threat to their relative power
in the region. According to realists, since no international organization is ultimately
capable of enforcing order, every state has to provide its own security.
Neorealists also try to explain why some countries are unable to find a
compromise and cooperate in order to solve the dispute. All countries, interested in
Arctic territories, are concerned about the relative gains that can be achieved from oil
and gas exploration in the disputed territories. From the neo-realists‟ perspective, the
disputes in the Arctic appear to epitomize a zero-sum game. The definitive
characteristic of a zero-sum game is that players have strictly opposed preferences.
Interaction between Russia and Norway, and the United States and Canada are
competitive; no grounds for bargaining and agreement exist. Zero-sum game
territorial disputes are particularly resistant to peaceful settlements. Therefore,
awarding sovereignty rights, over a certain territory to one party, result in the loss for
another claimant.8
As mentioned above, an ongoing dispute over the drilling for the natural
resources in the Arctic Circle is becoming a crucial issue that will shape future
relationships among the states. According to neorealists, international anarchy fosters
competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate, even

8

Veronica Ward, “Regime Norms as „Implicit‟ Third Parties: Explaining the Anglo-Argentine
Relationship,” Review of International Studies 17(2) (1991): 174-177, 179-183.
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when they share common interests.9 They theorize that should a compromise be
reached and an agreement negotiated, countries would still not be able to overcome
the issue of uncertainty about another party‟s intentions. Despite the concern about the
relative gains, a possibility of cheating, opponents‟ non-compliance is another
obstacle to the agreements.10,11
Other international relations theories try to diminish realists‟ ability to explain
the disputes in the Arctic Circle in terms of gaining power and international
recognition. Alternative theories may suggest that the disputed areas are not of vital
importance to assure claimants‟ position in the international system. However, the
gaining of sovereignty right over a certain territory may lead to more ambitious claims
toward the resources and territory in the Arctic.12
Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism supports the neo-realist view about international anarchy.
Moreover, it claims that states are rational egoists that calculate costs and benefits of
alternative actions. States are egoists, because they are independent. Neoliberals
oppose neorealists and suggest that states are concerned about their possible absolute
gains, rather than relative gains.13 Therefore, they gain or lose not because they lose or
gain over others. Hence, neoliberals do not perceive the dispute over the territory in
the Arctic as a zero-sum game. Instead, they would describe it as a mixed-motive
game where both incompatible and coincidental interests occur between the parties
involved.
9

Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism,” International Organization 42(3) (1988): 487-488.
10

Ibid.
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Mearsheimer, 12, 13.
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Ward, 176-177.
Grieco, 496-499.
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Doyle14 claims that states are peaceful, however he does not deny the possibility
of war over resources. This could explain the tensions in the Arctic over the resources.
However, Kant, liberal internationalist, claims that liberal states exercise peaceful
restraint and peace exists among them. With the increase in number of liberal states in
the world, the possibility of global peace will rise. Nevertheless, a subtype of
Neoliberalism – liberal internationalism does not deny the likelihood of the war
between liberal and non-liberal states. Liberal states assume that non-liberal states are
not just. This logic can be applied to the dispute between Russian and Norway. Since
non-liberal governments such as in Russia are aggressive with their own people,
liberal governments perceive the foreign relations policies of non-liberal
governments‟ as deeply suspicious. Liberal republics are prepared to protect private
property and the right of individuals overseas against non republics and promote
democracy by any means necessary. This liberalists‟ position explains, why Russia
may not be a trustworthy partner for Norway.15 The regimes in both countries are
different, which according to liberals, would explain why there was a possibility for
the war to break out in the first place.
Moravcsik indicates the neoliberal theory seeks to generalize the social
conditions under which the behavior of self-interested actors moves towards
cooperation or conflict. When willingness to employ coercion does exist, it can be
associated with a few factors. Divergent fundamental beliefs, for example, a
democratic regime versus an autocratic regime, may be one factor that could generate
tension. Secondly, conflict over scarce natural resources such as oil and gas, as in the

14

Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” The American Political Science Review 80 (4)
(1986): 1152-1154, 1156.
15

Ward, 184-185.
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case in the Arctic, may contribute to the employment of force.16 Finally, inequalities
in political power may lead to conflict, in addition to issues around representation and
state preferences. In Norway, the United States and Canada, representative institutions
and practices reflect the preferences and social power of individuals that are translated
into state policy. However, in Russia, the leader could be motivated overwhelmingly
by his personal political ambitions.
Neoliberalism permits state preferences to vary while holding power and
information constant. It focuses on how domestic conflict, not international anarchy,
imposes outcomes.17 In an anarchic international environment, states are not the same
and the nature of the domestic political regime has an important influence on foreign
policy behavior. Liberals would suggest that each claimant in the Arctic could create
tension in the disputed territory in order to divert attention from domestic political and
economic problems facing them at home. Governments, especially non-democratic
ones, often tend to turn to foreign policy issues in the hope that the people will forget
about their domestic plight. Moreover, there is a linkage between domestic oppression
and foreign aggression. Tyrannical rulers, who ignore moral and legal constraints in
the treatment of their citizens, tend to ignore similar constraints in dealing with other
nations, because their actions go unchallenged. Dictators inevitably become persuaded
that they can remain unpunished for their actions.18 Thus, neoliberals would argue that
regimes and behavior are inextricably linked. Dispute settlement would limit the
states‟ freedom of action as it would have to respect certain boundaries. Neorealists
would suggest that regimes, being the creations of states, have no independent

16

Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,”
International Organization 51 (4) (1997): 517, 526.
17

Ibid., 518-520.

18

Fernando R. Teson, “Review,” The American Journal of International Law 81 (2) (1987): 556-562.
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influence or value beyond that which is specifically granted or assigned to it by
member states. For neorealists, states, driven by survival considerations, become
members of regimes (such as UNCLOS) only to enhance their own positions in
international system. Neoliberals claim that individual states may refine their interests
and seek joint gains in some areas, while continuing to play the zero-sum game in
other fields. The answer of which tactic a state is going to prefer lies in the existence
of international regimes as social institutions. Krasner indicates that in a world of
sovereign states, the basic function of regimes is to coordinate state behavior to
achieve desired outcomes in particular issue-area.19 Thus international regimes, as
social institutions, function to shape and constrain the behavior of individual actors
and groups of actors in the international arena. In addition, neoliberals would argue
that even though cheating is an obstacle to cooperation among rationally egoistic
states, international institutions can help states to overcome this barrier to joint action.
Here the importance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
emerges.
This thesis claims that there is no doubt that countries realize the benefits of
cooperation and a need to avoid the zero-sum game, where there is only one winner in
the field. Seminal approach is vital to maintain the stability in the region. The interest
and priorities of all countries should be taken into consideration to ensure the peaceful
management of relations among the countries in the Arctic.
Methodology
This thesis employed qualitative data in order to verify the research question of
whether cooperation or conflict dominates international relations in the Arctic.
19

Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables,”
International Organization 36 (2) (1982): 186-190.
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Selected sources mainly include written studies on the Arctic problematic. One of the
different positions on the disputes in the Arctic, were analyzed by reviewing sources
such as each country‟s Arctic strategy documents, newspapers, maps and critical
interpretations of them. Arctic is a current issue on the international relations agenda,
therefore, I will also rely on the secondary sources such as journal articles, and books.
Before starting to analyze the thesis question, it is crucial to define what the
Arctic is. The Arctic had been studied for centuries, yet there is no clear geographical
or juridical definition describing it. Each Arctic country prefers to have its own
definition of the Arctic.20 For the purpose of this paper, the Arctic is defined as the
northern polar region located around the North Pole and limited in the South by the
Arctic Circle, i.e. parallel 66°32‟ North latitude.21 Figure 1 indicates this area, which
is approximately three times the size of mainland Europe – 30 million km2.22

Figure 1. Arctic borders. The Arctic Human Development Report Boundray is shown in red. The map
is available at: http://arctic-council.org/section/maps_and_photos.
20

For more details regarding definitions see Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response
(EPPR), “Field Guide for Oil Spill Response in Arctic Waters 1998,” Environment Canada (Canada:
Yellowknife, 1998), iv. Available at: http://eppr.arctic-council.org/content/fldguide/fldguide.pdf.
21
Definition is used by the Arctic Council. Available at: http://arcticcouncil.org/section/the_arctic_council.
22
Alf H. Hoel, “The High North Legal-Political Regime,” in Security Prospects in the High North:
Geostrategic Thaw or Freeze?, eds. Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor (Rome: NATO
Defence College, May 2009), 83.
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There are two major reasons why the Barents Sea dispute and the Beaufort Sea
dispute were chosen for a research. Firstly, both disputed areas encompass the
region‟s two major oil deposits locations.23 In 1981, report by the U.S National
Petroleum Council on U.S. Arctic oil and gas noted that the Beaufort Sea may contain
12.9 billion barrels of oil.24 Meanwhile, Russia estimates that the recoverable
resources in the disputed area in the Barents Sea may equal the equivalent of 39
billion barrels of oil or 6.6 trillion cubic meters of gas or a combination of both. 25
Other experts say the estimation is exaggerated, while some speculate the amount of
resources is even greater. Secondly, even though most of the Arctic‟s rich oil and gas
resources lie not in the disputed territories, but within established boarders, the
ownership of the assets in the areas of Barents Sea and Beaufort Sea are open to
serious question. Therefore, the Barents Sea and the Beaufort Sea disputes are similar
in causing considerable controversy and rival‟s disputes.
As a result, the research will include a data on how the disputed areas should be
divided. The first criteria for determining how the area should be divided, is the
median line method, which means that borders should be drawn according to the
length of a country‟s coast – every point of the median line is equidistant to the
nearest point on the coast. The United States and Norway favor median line method.
Another approach, which is preferred by Russia and Canada, is the sector
method as legal grounds to claim territory in the Arctic. 26 Sector approach allows
countries to claim a pie-shaped area, which is formed by drawing the lines from

23

Charles Emmerson, “Our Friends in the North,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, September 29, 2010,
accessed February 28, 2011, http://rbth.ru/articles/2010/09/29/our_friends_in_the_north04992.html
24
Donald R. Rothwell, Maritime Boundaries and Resource Development: Options for the Beaufort Sea
(Canada: The University of Calgary, 1988), 28.
25
Chris Weather, “Race for the Arctic and for FDI,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, September 15,
2010, accessed February 28, 2011,
http://rbth.ru/articles/2010/09/15/race_for_arctic_and_fdi04945.html.
26
Howard, 59.
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country‟s coast to the North Pole.27 The different approaches to the demarcation of
borders prove the challenges that disputes in the Arctic pose.
Arctic Strategy Documents
It is crucial to include in the research, current Arctic strategy documents that
were issued by all disputant countries: Norway, Russia, Canada, and the United States.
The existence of such documents indicates the importance of the Arctic and
emphasizes the opportunities available and the challenges that each claimant country
is going to face in the near future. I intend to analyze only those parts of strategy
documents that are related to this thesis, which are cooperation and conflict in the
region. In particular I am interested in the language in which the documents are
written, identifying the positions that the countries are taking and how they differ.
Moreover, this research will evaluate each claimant‟s intentions and strategic
priorities in the Arctic. Attention to the each country‟s military presence and activities
in the region will be crucial as well.
Russian Arctic strategy
Russia can be identified as one of the most determined Arctic players. It seeks
recognition of its leading role in political, economic and military areas in the Arctic. 28
Russia has been stressing the importance of its role in the Arctic in the National
security strategy and the Arctic strategy. On May 2009 Russia‟s President Dmitry
Medvedev approved a national security strategy. 29 The document introduced a change

27

Ibid., 60.

28

Katarzyna Zysk, “Russia‟s Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints,” Joint Force Quarterly 57
(2)(2010).
29

Security Council of Russian Federation, National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until
2020 [СТРАТЕГИЯ национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года], May 12,
2009, No. 537, accessed March 1, 2011, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html.
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in the national security concept, which is defined in a more conciliatory manner
compared to the previous one that was introduced in 1997 and relied on military
approach. The new national security strategy among various issues identifies the
necessity to direct attention of international policy focusing on the possession of
energy resources. The Barents Sea and its resources are among the locations that are
identified as being important to Russian foreign policy. What is significant to this
thesis, is that Russia emphasizes the commitment to protect its national interest in
adherence to the international law, which excludes the possibility of confrontation and
fosters a conduct of a rational and pragmatic foreign policy. Meanwhile, Russia is
determined to preserve its competitiveness and maintain its influence in the
international arena.
Another important document which defines Russia‟s views on the Arctic is the
“Fundamentals of Public Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period
up to 2020 and Beyond.”30 This document reveals information about a strategy that
was adopted in September 2008. It clearly states that Arctic is a region of great
importance to Russia due to its potential for gas and oil resources, and profitable
maritime transport through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR is a crucial
element in the maritime connection between Asia and Europe. Among the interest of
the Russian Federation in the Arctic is the preservation of peace and cooperation in
the area. The expansion of the resource base in the Arctic through the use of advanced
technologies to extract the resources is listed among the aims and priorities of Russia.
One of the top priorities, listed in the Arctic strategy, is defining the limits of the
continental shelf by 2015. Moreover, it identifies international cooperation as its
30

Security Council of Russian Federation, Fundamentals of Public Policy of the Russian Federation in
the Arctic for the Period up to 2020 and Beyond [Основы государственной политики Российской
Федерации в Арктике на период до 2020 года и дальнейшую перспективу], September 18, 2008,
accessed March 1, 2011, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html.
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priority in the region, which will be enforced through mutual bilateral and multilateral
agreements among the Arctic states. Russia‟s Arctic strategy document suggests that
its country does not believe in the military confrontation in the region. However, it
speaks to the possibility of tensions that may develop due to the potential of resources
in certain areas of the Arctic, specifically in the Barents Sea.31 Interestingly, Russia is
determined to establish a special Arctic military formation which would protect its
country‟s interests in military and political situations should any arise. Russia‟s Arctic
policy document targeted the presence of NATO in the Arctic region, as NATO
identified the Arctic as an area of increasing strategic interest among the states. In
general, Russia is focused on maintaining and strengthening its leading position in the
Arctic.
K. Zysk in the article “Russia‟s Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints”
identifies the difference in the perception of security in the region between the current
Russian position in the region and the previous Arctic strategy, which was adopted in
2001. She indicates that the country‟s current position is more moderate and avoids
assertive rhetoric which was commonly used by Russia in previous years. Various
issues in the region, specifically related to military security, were perceived by Russia
as a zero-sum game which claims that in general, states are prone to compete and are
hostile to one another. Russia‟s confrontational position in the past was based on idea
that Russian and the Western interest are incompatible and diverging. In particular,
Russia still perceives NATO military presence and exercises within close proximity to
Russia‟s borders as a threat to the country‟s national security. It creates a ground for
mistrust and tension between the countries. However, Russia has begun to adopt a
more constructive approach that demonstrates a willingness to claim territory in the

31

Zysk, “Russia‟s Arctic Strategy,” 108.
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Arctic in accordance to international law. This approach is more constructive and
explicit in current foreign policy documents.32
I. Overland, in the article “Russia‟s Arctic Energy Policy” offers a different
view on Russia‟s politics. She admits that Russia is often mentioned in the
international arena as relying on expansionist and militarist policy. Nevertheless,
Overland suggests a different interpretation of Russia‟s current behavior.33
The belief about negative, imperialist image was strengthened in 2007 when two
Russian scientists A. Sagalevich and A. Chilingarov planted the Russian flag in the
North Pole.34 However, Overland indicates that such flag planting act was not unique
and is common among explores when they reach difficult targets as Mount Everest,
North Pole, and Moon. Moreover, the aim of the expedition was to collect samples
that would serve as evidence necessary for the recognition of prolongation of Russia‟s
continental shelf in accordance with the international law. 35 However, in my opinion,
flag planting ceremony reminded the world how unpredictable and provocative can be
Russians behavior.
While Overland was analyzing the Russian strategy in the Arctic, she noticed
that the content and language of the strategy was strikingly similar to the western
policy language in the Arctic. It emphasized all the politically correct points such as
cooperation, increased Russia‟s participation in international forums.36 Even though
the language of the current Russian strategy documents seemed to dismiss the
possibility of military confrontation, the actual behavior of Russia did not change. For
example, the flights over strategic bombers along the coast of Norway and the conduct

32

Ibid., 110.
Indra Overland, “Russia‟s Arctic Energy Policy,” International Journal (2010): 865-878.
34
Howard, 2.
35
Overland, 866-867.
36
Ibid., 867.
33
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of military drills continued in 2009.37 K. Zysk indicates that current document clearly
identifies priorities and areas of interest in the Arctic which helps to predict Russia‟s
behavior. However, it lacks strategy to pursue the goals systematically within a certain
time limit.38
Norwegian Arctic strategy
Norwegian government released its High North Strategy (HNS) in December
2006.39 It indicates the importance of the Arctic region for Norway‟s national
interests. The strategy assures the continuation of good relations and active dialogue
with neighboring countries and key allies such as the United States and the European
Union.40 In particular, determination to strengthen cooperation with Russia is evident
throughout the entire strategy. Russia is important not only in its proximity to
Norway, but also due to its claims in the Barents Sea. Norway admits the significance
of Russia in the management of the resources, which only can be assured by
cooperation between the countries.41 Norwegian government calls for the assurance of
sustainable development in the High North.42 In addition, the strategy indicates the
opportunity that the Barents Sea resources provide.43 The Barents Sea and its riches
are believed to be a perfect source of energy for Europe in the near future. Moreover,
Norway is a stable and trustworthy energy supplier which offers secure and
transparent conditions and predictability.44

37
38

Zysk, “Russia‟s Arctic Strategy,” 108.
Ibid., 104-108.

39

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Norwegian government’s High north strategy (HNS)
(2006), accessed March 10, 2011, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/strategien.pdf.
40
Kristine Offerdal, “Arctic Energy in EU Policy: Arbitrary Interest in the Norwegian High North,”
Arctic 63(1) (2010), 31.
41
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Ibid., 34, 55-56.
44
Offerdal, 31.
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The message of the High North Strategy can be described in three words:
presence, activity and knowledge.45 Norway is determined to be a visible player in the
Arctic. It will be active in exploring and protecting the region at national and
international levels. It admits that energy supply and security issues are becoming
increasingly important in international agendas. Norway seeks to gain more
knowledge about the existing opportunities in the Arctic, as well as discover the new
ones. However, Norway admits that there are some differences in opinions concerning
specific questions and points of international law regarding exploration and
exploitation of the resources. However, it claims that accessibility of resources in the
Barents Sea will foster cooperation rather than conflict in the area.46
High North Strategy also includes the presence of Norwegian Armed forces. Its
main objectives are to gather information, and exercise authority and sovereignty. 47 In
general Norway‟s HNS assures that Norway is determined to act in transparent and
predictable manner in the region.
Canada’s Arctic region policy
Canada introduced its Northern Strategy (NS) in 2009.48 It seeks to achieve
international recognition of the country‟s presence and position in the Arctic. The NS
emphasizes four priority areas: “…exercising our Arctic sovereignty; promoting social
and economic development; protecting the North‟s environmental heritage; and
improving and devolving northern governance.”49 In pursuing all these objectives
Canada is committed to demonstrating and maintaining its sovereignty, rights, and
jurisdiction in the Arctic region. In August 20, 2010, Lawrence Cannon, Canada‟s
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Minister of Foreign Affairs, released the Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign
Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy.50 The
statement defines the priorities in the Arctic and builds on the four pillars emphasized
in the 2009 NS.
For Canada exercising Arctic sovereignty means demonstrating leadership in the
international arena by promoting stability and transparency in accordance with
international law. It its NS Canada commits to engagement in negotiations in order to
resolve existing boundary issues with Denmark over Hans Island and with the United
States over the Beaufort Sea, in accordance with international law. In addition,
Canada is determined to seek international recognition in regards to Canada‟s
extended continental shelf.51
K. Zysk indicates Canada has demonstrated willingness to strengthen its military
presence and demonstrate authority regarding activities in the Arctic. 52 In 2009,
Canada‟s performed an annual series of military activities known as Operation
Nanook in the area.53 The sea, land, and air force exercises, that took place in
Canada‟s Arctic territory, proved the country‟s determination to show its presence in
the area.
F. Griffith, in his paper “Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy,” argues that the
Arctic became a region of strategic rivalry among the countries. There is no denying
that cost and risk will be involved trying to defend each country‟s interests.54
However, he assures that cooperation is vital in securing Canadian Arctic interests.
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Griffith suggests three main objectives of Canada‟s strategy and active involvement in
shaping the future of the Arctic.55 Firstly, he points out that it is necessary to engage
the highest political level in the conduct of international relations in the Arctic.
Secondly, he suggests that an engagement of Arctic powers such as the United States
and the Russian Federation is crucial in order to achieve a deeper and broader
cooperation in the region. Finally, Griffith claims that invigoration of the Arctic
Council is essential in regards to competence and better coordination of collective
actions.56
Meanwhile, R. Huebert suggests that Canada should to be more engaged in the
Arctic issues. The attention that the Arctic is receiving from decision makers is not
sufficient, giving the rising international significance of the region.57 He also proposes
the increasing of surveillance and enforcement capabilities in the Arctic to ensure
other countries of Canada‟s determination to be an active player in the region.
Moreover, Huebert calls for closer cooperation with the Russian Federation and the
United States in order to reach an agreement on the rules of engagement.58
In general, Canada‟s Arctic foreign policy emphasizes Canada‟s intension to
exercise leadership and demonstrate responsibility. It is determined to respond to any
actions, made by other countries, which might affect Canada‟s national interests.
Canada‟s approach in the Arctic will be committed to collaboration, diplomacy and
regard for the international law.
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United States and the Arctic
The United States announced its Arctic Region Policy (ARP) in the National
Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive on
January 9, 2009.59 This directive, signed by President George W. Bush, replaced 1994
Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-26 with respect to Arctic policy. The new
document indicates increased United States interest in the Arctic and lists a number of
issues in regards to the region and to U.S. priorities.60 Among the interests of the
United States are national policies on homeland security and defence, climate change
increased activity in the region, the Arctic resources, boundary issues, energy and
environmental protection, and the role of the Arctic Council, which the United States
claims should continue to have the current general mandate without transforming it
into a formal international organization.
The document indicates the United States willingness to act independently in the
region, while emphasizing regional cooperation at the same time. The directive also
encourages peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic. Moreover, paragraph C calls
for the Senate to accede to the 1982 UNCLOS in order to protect and assure U.S.
interest in the Arctic. The current U.S. administration, under President Barack Obama
and the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, encourages ratification of the treaty as the
Arctic region is becoming very important in the international arena.61
Furthermore, the unresolved dispute in the Beaufort Sea is mentioned in
paragraph D, suggesting that the United States has a strong position on the solution to
the dispute based on the equidistance principle. The directive also mentions the
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maritime boundary treaty between the United States and Russian Federation dating
back to 1990.62 The United States is urging Russia to ratify the agreement.
Although the United States suggested it has a solution to the dispute, Lieutenant
Colonel Allan L. Kollien in his strategy research paper “Toward an Arctic Strategy”,
indicates that the United States lacks a comprehensive Arctic strategy in order to
secure its position and defend the interest in the region.63 The paper analyzes the main
objectives of the United States in the Arctic relying on the Arctic Policy Directive.
Kollien urges the United States congressional leadership to adhere to the international
legal regime in order to defend its Arctic interests. He indicates that strategy has to
link three crucial points: ends, means, and ways. 64 Firstly, goals should be set and
objectives should be reached in order for a strategy to be successful. Secondly, it is
essential to define the means, which would be used to achieve the goals. Finally, the
ways to reach the goals with the aid of the resources should be identified. As was
clearly stated in the Arctic policy, the need for a framework for the effective pursue of
policy is necessary. 65 The challenge that the United States encounters is a legal regime
to ground its claims and meet its interest in accordance with national and homeland
security objectives. The issue of the ratification of the UNCLOS arises. 66
In addition, Kollien mentions the need for a united command that would control
unified action and would be able to achieve a united effort in the Arctic region.
Basically, Kollien offers to review a sphere of influence among three combatants –
U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Northern Command – in
order to ensure adequate management of the Arctic region.67 Kollien suggests that
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U.S. Northern Command should be responsible for the majority of operations in the
Arctic instead of coordinating three combat commands.68 In general, Kollien calls for
a rapid design for a comprehensive strategy in the Arctic, raising issues to be solved,
and offering constructive solutions for the problem.69
R. Huebert observed that United States Arctic policy documents suggest that the
Arctic is a strategically valuable region, where the possibility for tension between the
United States and Canada could arise. He also observed that nowhere in the U.S.
Arctic documents is there any mention of cooperation between the United States and
Canada. On the contrary, the U.S. Arctic strategy document indicates the United
States determination to act independently, if necessary, to defend its interests in the
region.70
Furthermore, R. Huebert suggests that Arctic countries are improving their
military capabilities in the High North. The countries claim that this is a natural
reaction to the expected increase in activity in the region, as military presence is
necessary to ensure the coasts are protected and guarded. However, it was noted that
Norway‟s and Russia‟s increase in weaponry is designed for war as opposed the
guarding of the coast.71
Growing global demand for gas and oil, along with depleting reserves in
existing fields will create tensions and conflict scenarios that were not anticipated in
the countries‟ strategies. As was indicated above, Arctic countries are interested in
rebuilding their military capabilities which creates a possibility for tension and
mistrust in the region. As the Arctic is rapidly changing, new economic opportunities
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are being discovered. Inevitably countries react to the changing situation and adapt to
it. Obviously, countries feel a need to prepare to defend their sovereignty and interest
should any risk arise.72 The question is, whether publicly available access to the
documents, concerning national strategic issues, may suggest the possibility of
controversial elements being intentionally excluded from the documents? Thus, each
country‟s real priorities and intentions may not be mirrored in the Arctic policy
documents and are kept in secret. On the other hand, even though the formulation of
the documents might be carefully compiled, they are still official statements that
reflect each government‟s position on how to deal with sensitive issues in the Arctic.
Cooperation in the Region
It is important to state that countries demonstrated willingness to cooperate in
the region. In 1996, eight Arctic states – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland,
the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States – agreed upon the creation of
the Arctic Council and signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic
Council.73 The aim of this intergovernmental forum is to promote cooperation, address
important issues arising in the Arctic Circle, and develop new initiatives. The Council
aims at protecting the environment and assuring sustainable development in the
Arctic. Moreover, it acknowledges the importance of the Arctic region‟s indigenous
people who are greatly involved in the Council‟s proceedings. However, the Council
does not address the issues of military security in the region.74
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Another important document indicating cooperation among five Arctic countries
(Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States) is the
Ilulissat Declaration, which was adopted in the Arctic Ocean Conference in Greenland
in May 2008.75 It aims to address the possibilities and challenges of the changing
nature of the Arctic. In addition, the declaration indicates that countries see no need to
create a new comprehensive international legal regime in the area.76 The countries
agreed to adhere to the United Nations‟ Convention on the Law of the Sea in solving
the issues of the delineation of their overlapping maritime boundaries, the use of the
sea, scientific research and the protection of the environment. Countries committed to
the sharing of the information and data, to ensure a peaceful management of the Arctic
Ocean.
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Chapter II: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Introduction
As oceans started to generate a multitude of claims, counterclaims and
sovereignty disputes, the need for a more stable order was evident. Rapid development
of technology created an opportunity to exploit ocean resources that were previously
inaccessible. This propelled countries to claim sovereignty beyond the traditional
three mile limit. Interestingly, in 1945 the United States was the first country to
question the seas doctrine claiming sovereignty to the outer continental shelf and its
resources. This claim is known as Truman Proclamation.77 Other nations followed the
United States example to claim their continental shelf. As a result, the need for a
comprehensive regime emerged.
Law of the Sea Conferences
The General Assembly convened two conferences on the Law of the Sea (LOS).
The goal of UNCLOS I was to develop and codify the law of the sea. The conference
resulted in the adoption of four conventions regarding the territorial sea, the high seas,
the continental shelf, and fishing and conservation of living resources on the high
seas.78 However, these conventions had a plethora of flaws. For instance, in the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf79 a consensus was not reached with regards to a
fixed limit for the territorial sea.80 In 1960, the second conference (UNCLOS II) was
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convened. However, it failed to resolve the outstanding issues emphasized after
UNCLOS I. In 1967, Malta‟s Ambassador to the United Nations, Arvid Pardo,
emphasized the critical situation concerning the pollution and devastation of the
oceans and the seas due to the practices of countries. He called for an effective
international regime that would go beyond national jurisdiction. Without an
international regime, the degradation of the seas was inevitable. Even though the
initiative started with the seabed, later it turned in to a global effort to regulate all
ocean areas, seas, and its resources. These factors led to the convening of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The aim of the conference was to
write a comprehensive treaty for the oceans.81
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in
New York in 1973. It ended nine years later and the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted in December 1982. The UNCLOS
(Convention) is a constitution for the seas, which was discussed, bargained and
negotiated by the representatives from 160 sovereign countries. 82 The Convention was
an unprecedented attempt by the international community to regulate all aspects of the
resources of the sea and uses of the ocean. It defines the rights and responsibilities of
nations in their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the
environment, and the management of marine natural resources. The Convention is
comprised of 320 articles and 9 annexes that indicate the codification of customary
international law and its further development. On September 28, 2010, Malawi was
the last country to ratify the Convention. To date, 161 countries, including Canada,
Norway, and Russian Federation, are parties to the Convention. Until now the United
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States has neither signed nor ratified the treaty. 83 Ratification of, or accession to the
Convention indicates a state‟s consent to be bound by its provisions. The UNCLOS
came into force on November 16, 1994 after Guyana became the 60th country required
to adhere to the treaty. It took twelve years from the day it was first signed for the
treaty to come into force, due to Article 309 which prohibits countries to take any
reservations to any part of the treaty. 84 This caused countries to doubt and hesitate.85
The UNCLOS is believed to bring order and harmony to the practices of states
dealing with the oceans and the law of the sea. States are taking steps to exercise their
rights over neighboring seas, to assess the resources in their waters and on the floor of
the continental shelf in a manner consistent with the UNCLOS dictates.
However, Part XI of the Convention raised many concerns related to the
interpretation of it. Part XI deals with mining of minerals in the area, which are
“beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” and belong to international seabed area. 86
The Secretary-General initiated informal consultations among states in order to
resolve those areas of concern and achieve universal participation in the Convention.
Those consultations culminated in the “Agreement Relating to the Implementation of
Part XI of the UNCLOS.” It entered into force on July 28, 1996. The Agreement
emphasizes that the provisions of the Agreement and Part XI of the UNCLOS will be
interpreted and applied together as a single instrument. In addition, the provisions of
the Agreement will prevail if any inconsistency between the Agreement and Part XI
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appears.87 On September 28, 2010 Malawi was again the last country to ratify the
Agreement. At present, there are 140 countries, including Canada, Norway, and the
Russian Federation, that are parties to this Agreement. The United States has signed,
but not ratified the Agreement.88
Division of the Ocean
In order to ensure stability across the global waters it was important to agree on
a primary issue – the setting of limits and drawing the line between national and
international waters, and the extent of national sovereignty over the seabed. Parts II,
V, VI, and VII define the degree of sovereignty a nation may have over different
regions of the oceans. Further paragraphs will concentrate on the division of the
regions and the powers that countries may exercise in them. This thesis concentrates
on those aspects of UNCLOS that are common to the Beaufort Sea and the Barents
Sea case studies, with details to follow.
In the third Conference it was agreed that a country may measure its continental
shelf from the baseline.89 The definition of a territorial sea refers to a twelve nautical
mile long area, where there are no restrictions; thus, states can enforce their law,
regulate any use of that territory and exploit its resources.90 However, the Convention
retains the right of innocent passage through the states‟ territorial waters for naval and
merchant ships; as such a continuous and expeditious passage would not threaten the
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security of the coastal state or violate its laws. However, the provisions of innocent
passage indicate that in the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles
are obliged to navigate on the surface and to show their flag in order to be identified. 91
In addition to the state‟s right to enforce law within its territorial sea, coastal
states also possess the rights that extend for twenty-four nautical miles from state
shores. This area is called a contiguous zone where the coast guard may prevent
certain violations and enforce police supervision.92
Navigation
At the Conference negotiating the Law of the Sea, the issue, regarding the right
to the passage, divided major naval powers and coastal states controlling them. The
major naval powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union insisted that the
straits should be considered as the international waters. Meanwhile, coastal states felt
this would cause a threat to their national security due to the passage of foreign
warship so close to their shore. Therefore, coastal states demanded that the straits be
considered part of their territorial waters. Understandably, the major naval powers
opposed this requirement.93 The Convention introduced a new concept called “transit
passage” that combined the provisions of innocent passage and the freedom of
navigation on the high seas. Under this concept, straits are considered part of
territorial sea, except in the matters related to the transit passage. In the case of transit
passage, the strait is considered part of international waters. In addition, all ships and
aircraft must sail through it without delays or stopping, and they have to refrain from
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doing anything that might threaten the coastal state.94 The issue of the legal status of
the Northwest Passage is in the center of the dispute between Canada and the United
States. This issue will be discussed in Chapter IV.
Exclusive Economic Zone
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) recognizes the right of the coastal state to
exercise jurisdiction over the exploitation, development, conservation, and
management of all resources (the fish stocks, oil) to be found in the waters, on the
ocean floor, and the subsoil of an area extending 200 nautical miles from its shore.
Despite exclusive rights, coastal states also have some obligations according to the
Convention. They are responsible for preventing overfishing, pollution and facilitating
marine research in their EEZ.95
Continental Shelf
According to the UNCLOS Part VI Article 76,
“The continental shelf of a costal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or
to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured when the outer edge of the continental margin
does not extend up to that distance.”96
However, states may claim jurisdiction up to 350 nautical miles if they prove
that their continental shelf extends further than 200 nautical miles. 97 According to the
UNCLOS, a coastal state has to submit claims to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf. As a result, the Commission makes recommendations to the coastal
states regarding the establishment of the outer limits, which are final and binding. 98 In
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addition, coastal states have the right to harvest mineral and non-living material in the
subsoil of its continental shelf, to the exclusion of others. Coastal states also have
exclusive control over living resources attached to the continental shelf, but not to
creatures living in the water column beyond the exclusive economic zone.99
The Convention created three new international bodies: the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in Hamburg, the International Seabed
Authority located in Jamaica, and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf in New York.
ANNEX II of the Convention introduces the establishment of a Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) beyond 200 nautical miles.100 The coastal
states submit the data concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas
where those limits extend beyond 200 nautical miles. The Commission reviews and
passes judgment on the technical and scientific merits of the country‟s submission.
Moreover, the body provides with scientific and technical advice.101
Article 4 of ANNEX II indicates that each party to the Convention has ten years
after signing up to formally submit their geological arguments to the UN Commission
on Limits of the Continental Shelf. Currently, all five arctic countries, whose coast
lines board the Arctic Ocean, are preparing claims to extend their continental shelf.
There is no doubt that such claims are aimed at oil and gas resources to be found in
the extended area. Canada may be the biggest beneficiary, in terms of new territory,
due to the extension of its continental shelf.102
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Russia sees the region as an important source of revenue. Its major interest is
energy production and maritime transport.103 During 2007 expedition, the Russians
took some geological samples from the seabed which they hoped would be convincing
evidence to support their claim of the natural prolongation of its submerged land mass
to include both the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges.104,105 Convincing evidence has
to be presented in order to warrant for a claim to be issued.106 Russia acknowledges
that the Arctic is a giant potential reserve of natural resources.107 Therefore, Russians
perceive the Arctic as a key to enhance its bargaining power while dealing with
foreign companies and governments. Moreover, if Russia wins control over the
Arctic‟s gas resources, it could pipe them straight to the European consumers
bypassing transit countries (e.g. the Ukraine). The transit countries usually make the
exporter less competitive due to their lucrative fees charges for the transit through
their territory.108
In addition, Russia ratified the Convention on March 1997.109 In 2001, Russia
was the first of the countries in the Convention to submit a claim to extend its
continental shelf, which they believe covers the Podvodnikov Depression, as well as
the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges. 110 However, Russia was advised to further
develop its claim and was allowed to resubmit its case with more convincing
geological data.111
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Russia is not the only country to be interested in the Arctic‟s natural resources.
Norway has focused its interest towards north as well. There is no secret that
Norway‟s economy is dependent on oil and gas exports. The North Sea oil and gas
resources have provided Norway with vast revenues. However, it is rapidly depleting.
One of the most promising areas is believed to be above the Arctic Circle: two-thirds
of undiscovered natural resources are expected to be located in the Norwegian and the
Barents Sea.112 However, Norwegian politicians are divided. Some are opposing the
exploration or drilling for oil while others are sympathetic to the idea.
Norway ratified the Convention in July 1996 and in 2006 it submitted its case to
the UN Commission on Limits of the Continental Shelf, claiming the extension of its
continental shelf. The claim includes an area of the Norwegian Sea (known as
“Herring Loophole”), which lies beyond Iceland‟s EEZ. Moreover, it claims the right
over territories in the Western Nansen Basin, an area in the Barents Sea, the Loophole,
the area in “high seas” between Russia‟s and Norway‟s EEZ, and the “Grey Zone,”
the area adjacent to the coast of Russia and Norway.113 In 2008, the Russian
Federation reacted to the Norwegian claims by resuming Russian Navy activity and
sailing in the region claimed by Norway as its extended continental shelf.114 The
Russians did not violate international law, as it permits sailing into the EEZ and over
the continental shelf.
In 2009, the UN Commission‟s recommendations confirmed Norway‟s
substantial rights and responsibilities to the outer continental shelf encompassing an
area of 235,000 square kilometers.115 The press release, issued by the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the “outer limits that Norway establishes on
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the basis of the recommendations will be final and binding.” 116 It also indicates the
recommendations have no power over disputes related to delimitation between
Norway and bordering countries.
Canada is also determined to prove the extension of its continental shelf in two
underwater formations – the Lomonosov and Alpha Ridges, which lie in Canada‟s
offshore waters.117 However, in order to claim them as the outer continental shelf,
Canada has to present the evidence to the UN Commission on Limits of the
Continental Shelf by November 2013, which means not more than ten years after
ratifying the Convention.118 Nevertheless, Canada‟s claims toward the extension of
continental shelf are likely to encounter some difficulties. The situation between
Canada and the United States regarding the continental shelf in the Beaufort Sea is
complicated.119 As was indicated before, if the United States wants to claim the
natural prolongation of its continental shelf, it needs to become a signatory member of
the UNCLOS.
The possibility of extending the continental shelf presents the opportunities as
well as challenges to the Arctic countries. The countries must gather sufficient data to
prove their claims, and then prepare the diplomatic actions needed to deal with the
other claimants. As a Realist would claim, the competition over specific territories is
clearly evident.
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The Exploitation Regime
Resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are the
world‟s common heritage. The question arises: who has a right to mine the minerals
and under what rules? Part XI of the agreement, which was already discussed,
simplifies the exploitation system. The mining is regulated by the International Seabed
Authority, which authorizes seabed exploration and mining, and collects and
distributes the seabed mining royalties.120
The UNCLOS also defines the territory referred to as “high seas,” which is open
to all states and is under jurisdiction of international law. 121 The Convention
emphasizes the fundamental obligation of all states to protect and preserve the marine
environment.122 It urges states to cooperate in formulating rules and standards and to
take measures for the preservation of the oceans‟ environment.123 Moreover, the
Convention defines the rules for marine scientific research and cooperation in
conducting the research.124
Resolving Arctic Boundary and Resource Disputes
International treaties and customary international law are the key sources to
determine maritime boundaries.125 As was indicated before, two international treaties
– the UNCLOS and 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf – can be relied upon
setting the maritime disputes. The UNCLOS is important tool to determine
sovereignty of the continental shelf. Article 280 of Section XV of the Convention
urges countries to use “any peaceful means of their own choice” to resolve a dispute.
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Moreover, the Convention indicates that countries must exhaust all avenues to settle
the dispute before resorting to judicial procedures. There are three different types of
issues in the Arctic: bilateral issues regarding maritime boundaries, issues related to
the Arctic Ocean, and the status of straits126.127
The Convention on the Continental Shelf (CCS) preceded UNCLOS as authority
for determining jurisdiction of coastal seabed. The authority of CCS was transferred to
the UNCLOS, after the parties adopted (ratified) it. As indicated before, the United
States is not a member of the UNCLOS; hence, the CCS is in effect for this country
and may be relevant in the dispute of the Beaufort Sea. The CCS indicates that
countries have to seek to agree on the boundary. If the agreement cannot be reached,
the boundary is the median line (equals equidistance line). However, if there are any,
special circumstances can be applied. In contrast to CCS, UNCLOS does not give
significance to the equidistance principle delimiting continental shelves. The
UNCLOS indicates that in a situation, when parties exhaust all the means to reach a
solution, the ICJ may be an option to achieve equitable solution to the dispute.128
The Convention is unique in providing the mechanism for the settlement of
disputes, which is incorporated into the document. It makes it obligatory for parties to
go through the settlement procedure in case of a dispute with another party. Article
284 of the Convention suggests using the conciliation process established within
Annex V of the Convention. If either of these procedures is not acceptable for the
parties, Article 287 provides options for appeal. The first option suggests that parties
may submit the dispute to the International Tribunal for the LOS. 129 The second
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option is the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which is a key body in customary
international law. The ICJ ensures equitable solutions taking all the relevant
circumstances (such as configuration of relevant coastlines, proportionality between
the length of the coast and the area given for each party concerned from the new
boundary line) into account. However, there are various issues related with reliance to
the customary international law. The ICJ main critique is that it does not give enough
credit to the natural resources in the disputed area, as mostly delimitation issues arise
due to the access to the resource rich areas.130
The third option suggests that parties may choose to submit to binding
international arbitration procedures constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the
Convention. Finally, per Annex VIII, parties may decide to submit their case to
special tribunals with expertise to interpret customary international law in specific
types of disputes related to fisheries, protection and preservation of the marine
environments, marine research, and navigation (including pollution).131
Decisions made pursuant to any of these procedures, except for sensitive cases
involving national sovereignty, are binding and parties are committed in advance to
respect them.132 Moreover, at anytime, each party to the Convention can specify under
the “optional exceptions” not to be bound by one or more of the mandatory
procedures, if they involve existing maritime boundary disputes, military activities or
issues under discussion in the UN Security Council.133 If parties do not reach an
agreement on the specific means of settlement, then the fourth mean is to be
employed.134 As was indicated in the preceding chapter, Arctic countries in the
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Ilulissat Declaration agreed to solve any differences peacefully, through the
mechanisms defined in the UNCLOS. 135 Since the United States is not yet party to the
Convention, it is not clear how it will be able to use those mechanisms established by
the Convention. Moreover, as the United States is not a signatory to the Convention,
the United States is not obliged to follow UNCLOS bodies‟ decisions. These issues
will be analyzed in the following section.
The United States and UNCLOS
The United States is currently facing a legal challenge to enforce its Arctic‟s
territorial claims as stated in its Arctic policy. As was indicated before, although the
United States has signed the 1994 Agreement on Implementation, it has not yet
ratified the Convention. Therefore, the provisions of the treaty are not applied to the
United States. This section will analyze the reasons that prevented one of the most
powerful and influential countries from ratifying Convention, and the risks and
benefits that countries enjoy by being a party to the UNCLOS.
Since its drafting, the UNCLOS has been a contentious issue in United States
policy. President R. Reagan refused to sign it in 1982, because he was not convinced
that the accession to the Convention would serve U.S. interests. Specifically, the
United States objected to previously analyzed provisions of Part XI of the Convention,
which hindered U.S. economic and security interests.136 Several U.S. presidents had
pursued a goal to accede to the Convention; however those attempts were prevented
by Republican senators.137 According to the U.S. constitution, two-thirds of Senators
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have to vote in favor for the international treaty to be passed. R. Huebert indicates that
the main reason for the Republican senators to oppose the accession to the UNCLOS
is due to an ideological opposition to the United Nations.138
It is important to note that the United States participated in the subsequent
negotiations to modify the treaty. In 1994, the Agreement on Implementation was
adopted. President Bill Clinton signed the agreement, recognizing the Convention as
general international law. Nevertheless, the Senate did not ratify it. The Senate
claimed it was concerned about the vulnerability of corruption, abuse, and
mismanagement in many U.N. bodies (e.g. U.N. Human Rights Council). Until these
imperfections are prevented, and transparency and accountability is assured, the
United States will not consider acceding or ratifying any international treaties that
relies on U.N. institutions to enforce its provisions. The UNCLOS is no exception.
The United States is not willing to put at risk its freedom of action and limit its
sovereignty in the certain areas defined by the UNCLOS. Some UNCLOS provisions
empower anti-American environmental groups to impact on U.S. policies through
domestic and international court actions.139
In 2007, the Bush administration expressed its support for the UNCLOS.140
Bush indicated that the UNCLOS would benefit the Navy, as U.S ships would not
need to obtain permission from some coastal states to enter their waters. Other authors
contradicted this argument by indicating the reciprocal interest of coastal states to
abstain from such demands.141 The Bush administration also claimed that without
adhering to the UNCLOS, the United States would be unable to enjoy advantages of
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extraction of the resources in the deep seabed. However, the International Seabed
Authority takes into account the interest of developing rather than developed countries
concerning the exploitation of resources. Thus, it would hardly benefit the United
States. The Bush administration further claimed that participation in the treaty would
not undermine intelligence operations; nevertheless, intelligence activities are strictly
classified and it is not clear how the United States can benefit from the Convention.
Finally, the Bush administration insisted that the United States would prevent
decisions being made that are not in the national interested of the country.
Nevertheless, not all the Council decisions are based on consensus. Some of the
actions are subject to a majority or two-thirds vote.
U.S. State Department Legal Adviser, John B. Bellinger III, indicated that the
accession to the UNCLOS would bring a huge advantage to the national security of
the United States due to the clearly defined legal rights of the use of world‟s oceans.142
Furthermore, the ratification of the treaty would provide the United States with rights
over Arctic‟s natural resources.143 The Convention also offers a peaceful way to solve
overlapping claims through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
However, Lawrence A. Kogan points out that border disputes do not have to be
resolved through the mechanisms of the UNCLOS. Disputes can also be settled by
pursuing diplomatic bilateral negotiations or resorting to the mutually agreed upon
international legal forums such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Kogan gave an
example of Peru, which settled a border dispute with Chile without subjecting its local
and regional affairs to the international regime of the UNCLOS.
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In 2008, U.S. Senator James M. Inhofe voiced his traditional conservative
Republican position to the accession to the UNCLOS and indicated the necessity to
reject the treaty which he said not only does not benefit the United States, but also
threatens the sovereignty of the country.144 In short, the United States will gain too
little and will pay a high price if it accessed to the UNCLOS.145 Inhofe pointed out a
few of the hazards to which members of a treaty are exposed. Firstly, Articles 224-227
need to be reviewed and modified as they limit the operations of the U.S. Navy and
Coast Guard to an undesirable degree. Secondly, Articles 47-53 require clarification
as they permit foreign ships navigation in the U.S. territorial waters, which can be
perceived as a danger to the U.S. security. Thirdly, according to Article 82, parties to
the UNCLOS are bound to the regulations and taxation by an international body,
which funds its own research and distributes the world‟s wealth to the developing
countries. Currently, U.S. companies can harvest resources from the seabed within the
EEZ without paying a fee. If the treaty is ratified, and the United States extended its
continental shelf, U.S. companies would have to pay a fee for the exploration of the
resources in the extended area.146 Fourthly, Articles 61-69 require changes to ensure
U.S. sovereignty to manage resources in its EEZ. Moreover, Article 144 of UNCLOS
indicates the responsibility of developed countries to share its intellectual knowledge
with developing countries. This would put the United States in a position where it
would be forced to share its technology and information with possible competitors and
adversaries.147 Finally, dispute settlements through international authorities, courts
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and tribunals pose a legal danger for U.S. businesses which would be held accountable
for any violations. Therefore, opponents of the UNCLOS claim that Part XI of the
Convention needs to be reviewed and modified to prevent undesirable outcomes that
may impact upon U.S. sovereignty.148
Despite opposition to the UNCLOS, previously mentioned, a 2009 presidential
directive from the Obama administration indicates necessity to consider enhanced or
new international arrangements due to the increased activity in the Arctic region. The
current U.S. President recognizes the necessity and benefits of the Convention and it
is believed, that during his presidency, the United States may finally become a party to
the Convention.149 On the other hand, it is already the second half of Obama‟s
presidency and the situation concerning the accession to the Convention has not
changed. Interestingly, the United States already began preparing claims towards the
extension of their continental shelf.150 This indicates the anticipation of the accession
to the UNCLOS. Full participation in the treaty provides countries with possibility to
submit their dispute to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for a peaceful
resolution. Until the United States ratifies the treaty, it cannot be subjected to these
dispute processes and authorities. In addition, it would lack representation in different
U.N. committees that administer the treaty‟s extensive enterprises.151
Alan L. Kollien suggests that United States has three options related to the use
of UNCLOS as the basis for a legal regime. Firstly, he indicates that United States
might seek to modify the questionable provisions of the Convention and then to ratify
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it.152 However, changes to the UNCLOS may be unacceptable to the members of this
treaty. Even though this option is time consuming, it would help United States to
achieve the objectives defined in the Arctic policy. Secondly, Kollien predicts that
United States might ratify the Convention without any changes in it, accepting its
current form. It would benefit U.S. energy interests, but may hinder its sovereignty as
defined in certain UNCLOS provisions. 153 Finally, the United States would have to
identify and codify the provisions that it would treat as customary international law
and which provisions would be rejected. This option would help the United States to
pursue its goals within its EEZ and conduct operations abroad without a need to give
up its sovereignty. However, this option would not conform to the legal regime.
Furthermore, it reinforces a negative opinion among certain governments toward
America and its desire to act unilaterally.154 This thesis advocates adopting of the
second option by the U.S. government. Certain concessions need to be made in order
to enjoy the benefits that international legal regime brings. However, at present, the
ratification of the Convention is unlikely to happen, for as to date, the Obama
administration has not convinced the Senate. The United States government perceives
this choice as politically unfavorable and requiring more costs than would be won in
gains.
For almost thirty years, many members of the U.S. Senate have indicated that
the ratification of the Convention would impair the ability of the United States to selfgovern, leading to the diminished capacity of self-defence.155 If the United States
finally becomes a party to the Convention, this would strengthen the idea that Arctic
disputes should be settled relying on international arrangements rather than individual
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country-based governance and possible military buildup. I believe that the ratification
of the Convention would definitely benefit the United States. The United States is
increasingly dependent on imported oil, particularly from the Middle East. If the
United States could prove its entitlement to the region and natural resources beyond
Alaska, then it would be less dependent on oil and gas imports from foreign
countries.156 Furthermore, the ratification of the Convention would help the United
States in their claim regarding the Northwest Passage as an international strait rather
than as Canada‟s internal waters.157
The Law of the Sea Criticism
The UNCLOS is a huge achievement in international law. However, it is has
received some criticism. The implementation of the UNCLOS provisions relies on
national legislation that sets certain provisions as priorities. This gives credit to
national autonomy, but at the same time it proves to be risk and some nations may
prefer different priorities from those set forth in the provisions of the UNCLOS.
Moreover, it was previously indicated that seabed mining regime and the idea of profit
sharing is highly criticized by nations and is viewed as opposite to free-market
capitalism.158
In addition, it might be viewed as ineffective framework for border disputes in
the Arctic, as not all Arctic states have ratified the Convention. Therefore, the
decisions made by CLCS or any other method sanctioned by the UNCLOS for
maritime boundary settlements may not be recognized by non-signatory party if it
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finds the decision to be contrary to its national interests. Hence, such decisions would
not be definitive.159 On the other hand, for example, the United States has not yet
ratified the Convention, but it had followed many provisions of the Convention in
terms of customary international law.
Although the UNCLOS is a huge achievement, Donald Rothwell indicates a few
flaws in the UNCLOS. 160 The UNCLOS does not make specific reference to the
Arctic. It only mentions ice-covered waters that can be perceived as suitable for the
Arctic region.161 Rothwell refers to Article 76 of the UNCLOS as one of the major
drawbacks in the Convention. He claims that some definitions and terms used in
Article 76 are unclear or ambiguous. Moreover, members of the Convention lack
information to understand the justification for decisions made by CLCS, thus,
resulting in an inability to challenge those claims. In addition, he indicates that the
UNCLOS is based on the willingness of nations to cooperate as there are no real
sanctions to punish those who disrespect and violate the Convention.
Furthermore, the Convention also ignores some special issues that rise in the
polar ocean such as the management of high seas areas, the status of ice in
international law, the interaction and overlap of regional and global regimes, the
assertion of maritime jurisdiction over ice-covered waters (which are often distant
from populated areas), and fails to address the impact that this has on maritime
regulation and enforcement.162
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All in all, it is impossible to imagine an international Convention that makes all
parties fully satisfied. The UNCLOS will continue to confront nations with challenges
regarding compliance and harmonization with national legislature. There is no doubt
that the UNCLOS has contributed to better governance of the oceans and has clarified
the areas in which countries can exercise their sovereignty. In addition, it includes
dispute settlement provisions which peacefully resolve overlapping claims among
nations. It is crucial to realize that every benefit to exercise the rights given by the
Convention comes with obligations, which are necessary to fulfill.
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Chapter III: Arctic Resources and Delimitation Issues
Arctic Resources
The Arctic Circle is under siege by global warming. The sea ice there has lost its
thickness and it has been further affected by rapid melting. Approximately 41 percent
of permanent ice is estimated to have completely disappeared from the Arctic Circle
over the last quarter century.163 This leads to the increased attention to the region‟s
natural resources and their accessibility.
In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), a leading governmental scientific
research agency, released the first publicly available natural resource estimate for the
entire Arctic Circle.164 It intended to estimate the possible addition of gas and oil to
the world‟s natural resources from the newly discovered fields in the Arctic. The
Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal (CARA) included assessments of oil, gas, and
natural gas liquids in the region. According to CARA, the Arctic region is estimated to
contain 90 billion barrels of undiscovered recoverable oil, 50 trillion cubic meters of
recoverable gas, and 44 billion barrels of recoverable natural gas liquids.165 This is
equivalent to around 13 percent of world‟s total undiscovered oil, 30 percent of its
undiscovered natural gas and 20 percent of word‟s undiscovered natural gas liquids.166
According to the CARA, more than 70 percent of the mean undiscovered oil
resources are estimated to exist in Arctic Alaska, the Amerasia Basin, East Greenland
Rift Basins, the East Barents Basins, and West Greenland–East Canada. More than 70
percent of the undiscovered natural gas is believed to be located in the West Siberian
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Basin, the East Barents Basins, and Arctic Alaska. In addition, it is estimated that
approximately 84 percent of the undiscovered resources are lying offshore.167 The
extensive Arctic continental shelves are believed to contain the largest unexplored
prospective area for natural resources in the world.168
R. Huebert indicates another very promising source of energy – gas hydrates –
that is found in Arctic waters. Currently, though, they are not being extracted due to
the lack of technology to recover them and bring to surface. However, they are
believed to be an important future energy source. 169Apart from oil and natural gas
resources in the region, there are numerous other natural resources such as deposits of
coal, gold, diamonds, platinum, and other precious stones.170 Furthermore, tensions
among coastal states over the right to fish stocks have the potential to emerge.171
In addition, climate change and melting ice may also reshape the global
transport system by creating the opportunity for new shipping routes such as the
Northwest Passage (NWP) and Russia‟s Northern Sea Route (NSR).172 These
passages are crucial for freight shipping and adventure cruise tourism. Rising
temperatures173 increased the ability to ship through NP and NSR, for longer portions
of each year, due to the seasonal ice melt.174 Countries were soon to realize the
benefits that these two paths would bring. Both passages offer a significant decrease in
shipping time and distance compared to current shipping routes through the Suez and
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Panama Canal (Figure 2). Thus, it reduces the shipping cost as well.175 While Russia
has sovereignty over NSR, the right over NWP is in question. Canada claims that
NWP belongs to its internal waters while the United States objects to such a claim and
regards the passage as international waters.

Figure 2. Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage compared with currently used shipping
routes. (2007). UNEP/GRID-Ardenal Maps and Graphics Library. Retrieved March 29, 2011 from
http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/northern-sea-route-and-the-northwest-passage-compared-withcurrently-used-shipping-routes.

All of this contention may lead to conflict. R. Howard argues that the issue of
conflict over Arctic resources is exaggerated. He notes that most of the USGS
estimated resources fields lay not in the disputed territories, but within established
borders. Moreover, if the natural resources are in disputed areas,176 the amicable
relations between two countries would not be disrupted due to disagreements over one
issue.177 In addition, he indicates the statistical unreliability of estimates about the vast
amount of resources in the area.178 In disputes over the sophisticated methods used to
measure undiscovered resources, there is always a likelihood of imprecision. For
example, exploration of a few areas in the Barents Sea, believed to be rich in natural
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resources, appeared to bring disappointing results and proved the assessments to be
wrong.179 As a result, uncertainty about the exact amounts of resources and the issue
of their recoverability may well prevent countries from resorting to military actions.
However, Howard admits that countries will compete to claim territories in the
Arctic due to secure availability to supply and export revenues that they may enjoy
after claiming these areas rich in natural resources. Still, the lack of scientific proof
does not guarantee that resource wars in the Arctic are unlikely. Governments may
believe that the area is richer in resources than scientists claim.180
Disputes in the Arctic
There are a number of jurisdictional boundary issues in the Arctic that remain
unresolved. As was indicated in before, disputes fall into three categories: 1) the
bilateral issues between countries (Figure 3), 2) the issues pertaining to the central
Arctic Ocean concerning the expansion of the continental shelf, 3) and the question of
straits: the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route.181
Resolved/
Nr.

Disputes

Unresolved

1.

Unites States –
Canada: Beaufort Sea

Unresolved

2.

Russia – United
States: Bering Sea

Unresolved*

Compromise between median
line and sector line

3.

Canada – Denmark:
Davis Strait

1973

Median line

(minor dispute
remains over
Hans Island)
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Delimitation line

4.

Denmark – Iceland:
Farm Strait

1997

Median line

5.

Denmark – Norway:
Jan Mayen

1993 (decision
by ICJ), 1995
(bilateral
agreement)

Median line, but takes
geographical circumstances
into account.

6.

Denmark – Norway:
Svalbard

2006

Median line

7.

Iceland – Norway: Jan
Mayen

1980, 1981

Iceland gets a full EEZ and
defined seabed area is subject
to joint development and
sharing of benefits.

8.

Norway – Russia:
Barents Sea

2010

Compromise between median
line and sector line

Figure 3. Arctic EEZ boundaries. Resolved indicates the ratification of final agreement.182
*The United States and Russia agreed on delimitation line in 1990. However, Russia still has to ratify
183
the treaty. Thus, the treaty has not yet entered into force.

For the purpose of this thesis this chapter will concentrate on recently resolved
bilateral issues between Russia and Norway, and unresolved dispute between the
United States and Canada. Figure 3 indicates that currently there are two bilateral
boundary issues in the Arctic. One is in the Beaufort Sea between the United States
and Canada, and the other in the Bering Sea between the United States and Russia. In
most of the cases the median (or equidistance) principle was applied in the final
agreements.
Delimitation Methods
The basic rule regarding delimitation of marine boundaries between countries is
that delimitation should be based on agreement between the countries in dispute. The
issue is how the areas of overlapping claims should be divided. The overlap of claims
can be in countries‟ territorial waters, the EEZ and continental shelf, and also inland
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waters, when states share a bay. 184 In all these cases, the states face the challenge of
dividing jurisdiction over the resource.
As was indicated in the Figure 3, many states resolve their disagreements using
the equidistance (or median) principle. The equidistance rule can simply be described
as drawing a line across the area in question. This means that any point that is closer
to one coastal state is perceived to fall under that state's jurisdiction and control. This
rule is not expressly mentioned in the UNCLOS, except with regard to the territorial
sea. Despite that, it is usually used in practice and is increasingly relied on in judicial
and arbitral decisions regarding delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf
under the UNCLOS.185
In general, the median line principle favors states with convex coasts or small
islands; therefore states with concave coasts can see the equidistance rule as
disadvantaging them. However, the equidistance rule can be justified due to its
efficiency, as the line‟s location is easy to determine. It is logical that a state‟s
proximity to the sea defines its right to the control over that portion of the sea. As a
result, the closer the state is to the sea, the cheaper and more efficiently it can govern
and regulate that territory. 186
In the selected cases of the Barents Sea and Beaufort Sea, the United States
(Beaufort) and Norway (Barents) favor the median line method. Territorially, both
countries would benefit most from it. Nevertheless, countries can still apply for a
historic title or other special circumstances (respective lengths of coastline, the size of
the area to be delimited, and the previous conduct and attitude of the parties over a
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period of time) that would give it a right to claim a territory exceeding the median
line.187
Another delimitation approach, which is preferred by Russia (Barents) and
Canada (Beaufort), is the sectoral principal as legal grounds to claim territory in the
Arctic.188 The sector rule, in which the line is justified by the special circumstances,
allows countries to claim a pie-shaped area. The area is formed by drawing straight
lines from country‟s coast to the North Pole.189 As Igor S. Zonn indicates, “the borders
of polar sectors are linked to the state borders, while the establishment of a polar
sector does not predetermine the legal status of the marine space in this sector.”190
This means it does not refer to either the bottom, or fish resources.
Interestingly, the sector theory has no legal validity as a source of title or any
state jurisdiction in the High North.191 This conclusion was reached after examining
three possible legal bases for a sector theory: the two boundary treaties of 1825 and
1867, and the doctrine of contiguity and custom.192 Since the sector approach did not
result from state practice, it cannot be considered legally binding in regards to the
control of territorial or maritime areas. Norway rejects the sector principle as a
departing point for the division of the continental shelf, emphasizing its controversial
status in international law. The Norwegian government insists that the term “special
circumstances” refers only to geographical factors regarding the configuration of the
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coastline or the existence of islands.193 The sector approach is often referred to in
dividing the Polar Regions; however it has neither been tested nor generally
recognized in international law.
Nevertheless, the sector method can be a convenient approach to divide various
forms of state jurisdiction in the Arctic.194 It can be useful sharing the areas of
responsibility in implementing obligations defined in the UNCLOS such as to protect
and preserve the marine environment, and/or coordinate scientific research policies in
the Arctic Ocean. The different approaches to the demarking of borders show the
challenge that disputes in the Arctic pose.
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Chapter IV: Case Studies: the Barents and Beaufort Sea Disputes
The Barents Sea Dispute
A boundary issue between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea was resolved
in 2010. Therefore, I intend to analyze how this agreement was reached and whether
or not it can be applied to the United States - Canada dispute in the Beaufort Sea.
The Barents Sea dispute began in 1974 and encompassed sharp disagreements in
three areas.195 As indicated in the Figure 4,196 the first issue was related to the
Spitsbergen (Svalbard) archipelago (a cluster of islands that lie 300 miles off
Norway‟s north coast). The second issue was a disputed section of Barents Sea,
known as the “Grey Zone,” which covers 19,475 square nautical miles. The third issue
was over the status of the “Loophole,” which covers 60,000 square miles.
The dispute over the Spitsbergen derives from the Spitsbergen treaty of 1920.197
Article 1 of the treaty recognized Norway‟s full and unrestricted sovereignty over the
archipelago. However, the agreement included an unusual clause, which granted equal
rights for other countries to any natural resources found on the land and in the
territorial waters.198 Norway and Russia disagreed on the geographical reach of the
1920 Treaty. The question was whether the rights of equal treatment applied to the
maritime zones. Norway argued that the agreement did not include its territorial
waters and did not apply to the offshore deposits of oil or natural gas. Therefore, the
restrictions on Norwegian sovereignty set out in the Spitsbergen Treaty could not be
given a broader interpretation.
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Figure 4. Agreed schematic chart illustrating the sector line, the median line, the disputed area,
and the delimitation line according to the Treaty of September 15, 2010.199

However, Russians refuses to accept Norway‟s position due to the valuable natural
resources in the area. Another question was the status of the Spitsbergen continental
shelf. Norway insisted it was part of the Norwegian continental shelf, while Russia
claimed Spitsbergen has its own continental shelf.200 The agreement on this was
crucial to the management of marine and petroleum resources around the archipelago.
Russia clearly emphasized the importance of the Spitsbergen archipelago in the
High North. It was seen as crucial in securing military and economic interest in the
Arctic. Russia‟s Sergei Naryshkin, the former Deputy Prime Minister, and the former
Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, Nikolai Spasskii, indicated that a less
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visible Russian presence in Spitsbergen would have a negative impact on the
country‟s position in the Arctic in general. Therefore, it was important to preserve
their presence in there.201
The dispute over the “Grey Zone” was related to the delimitation of the
maritime boundary of waters between the adjacent coasts. As indicated before,
Norway relied on the median approach, while Russia favored the sectoral principle.
The fish stocks in the “Grey Zone” area are significant as they constitute nearly 4 per
cent of the total annual global fish catch, and accounts for 50 per cent of the
Norwegian, and 12 per cent of the Russians annual catch.202
The third issue – “Loophole” – was more complicated. This was because both
countries wanted to prove that their outer continental shelf (seabed and subsoil of the
submarine area, which is a natural prolongation of country‟s land territory) reached
beyond 200 nautical miles, which is the limit that is indicated in the UNCLOS. 203
Norway and Russia had different views on how the three issues had to be
handled. Norway perceived outstanding issues as a cluster of problems. Russians
regarded the three issues as a cluster-problem.204 Norwegian authorities insisted that
the issues are distinct problems which need to be dealt with separately. Meanwhile,
Russia favored a package deal, which would encompass all unresolved issues of
security policy, international law, economic issues, research and environmental
questions, and offer one solution for all of them. In order for Russia and Norway to
reach an agreement, both countries‟ policies had to be revised and changed to come up
with a compromise between the median line and sectoral principle.205
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Years of Negotiations
On February 15, 1957, the Royal Norwegian Government and the Government
of the Soviet Union reached their first agreement (concerning Varangerfjord) on
maritime boundaries in the Arctic.206 However, it did not extend into the Barents
Sea.207 In 1970, both countries began informal negotiations regarding the Barents Sea
on the basis of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. However,
divergent views on the delimitation approach brought the talks to a halt.
In 1977, the negotiations became even more complicated when both countries
established an EEZ of 200 nautical miles. The parties admitted they needed to draw a
boundary line in their continental shelf and EEZ, but could not reach an agreement on
the delimitation line again. Nevertheless, in 1978, following Norway‟s initiative to
negotiate, both parties agreed on a Grey Zone Agreement – a provisional practical
arrangement for control over fisheries and enforcement in a defined area of the
Barents Sea (Figure 5).208 The Agreement included a provision indicating that it
should not affect either party‟s position in the border negotiations.209 The Agreement
was limited to one year. However, the parties kept the Agreement subject to annual
renewal.
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Figure 5. 1978 Grey Zone Agreement. The Agreement Area‟s geographical scope is not identical to
that of the previously disputed area, nor it was it geographically balanced between the median line and
sector line. It was an „adjacent area‟ considerably extended in the western direction, so that to some
extent in geographical terms accommodated Soviet demands. 210

It is believed that Norway made some concessions to the Soviet Union in order
to avoid rising tensions in the area, fueled by the fear of Soviet determination to
impose the sector line unilaterally if no agreement was immediately reached. 211
During the following years, the parties announced both the resumption and suspension
of formal talks. However, no agreement was reached.212
In 2007, Norway and Russia revised the 1977 agreement, by updating and
clarifying the 1957 Agreement. It extended the maritime boundary in the
Varangerfjord. The area, covered by the revised agreement, lies to the South of the
Barents Sea. It also defined the delimitation line for the territorial sea, EEZ, and the
210
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continental shelf further north of the Varangerfjord. 213 This revision was perceived as
a positive contribution towards agreeing upon furthering the delimitation line in the
Barents Sea.
In September 2008, the Russian Secretary of the Security Council and former
Chief of the Federal Security Service, Nikolai Patrushev, stated that the attention to
the Arctic was increasing. As a result, the increase of competition among the Arctic
countries for the control over the resources was evident. In addition, he indicated the
growing presence of military bases in the Arctic. He urged Russia to take action if it
wanted to preserve its influence in the region. If no immediate decisions were made,
there was a possibility of being excluded from the Arctic in general.214
Treaty between Norway and Russia
In 2010, Russia decided to take action and prove to the world its ability to
cooperate and manage the disputes peacefully. In September 15, 2010 Russia and
Norway finally ended their forty year dispute and in Murmansk (Russia) signed the
“Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning
Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean.”215
The treaty ensures continuation of the parties‟ close cooperation in the sphere of
fisheries and contains provisions on cooperation regarding exploration of transboundary hydrocarbon (oil and gas) deposits. Moreover, it clarifies the limits of
sovereignty, the rights and jurisdiction of both states. Thus, it will provide stability
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and predictability of Russian - Norwegian relations and foster cooperation between
the two countries.
According to the treaty, Norway and Russia got approximately equal parts216 of
the disputed territory. 217 A compromise between the median line and sector approach
was reached. The underlying calculation relied on a longer Russian coastline.
However, the other factors that Russia sought to influence in the delimitation did not
affect the boundary line.218 Once an agreement went into force,219 it terminated the
1978 Grey Zone Agreement.
For the treaty to come into force, both countries had to ratify it. In February 8
2011, Norway‟s parliament (Stortinget) ratified the agreement.220 Subsequently, on
March 25, Russia‟s State Duma ratified the treaty, as did the Federation Council,
Russia‟s upper house of parliament, five days later. On April 8, the President of
Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, signed the Federal Law on the ratification of
this treaty.221 This completed the process of establishing the maritime boundary that
divides both states‟ continental shelves and EEZ in the Barents Sea and the Arctic
Ocean.
The reasons and implication for the agreement on the Barents Sea
One of the most significant reasons that drove Norway and Russia to cooperate
was their economic interest in the area. Both countries needed to exploit the resources
of the Arctic. Norway‟s North Sea production is reaching its limits and Russia‟s
Siberian fields are close to depletion. Therefore, without the resources from the
216
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Arctic, both countries could no longer maintain the levels of oil and gas production on
which the rest of Europe increasingly depends.222
A second reason for ratifying an agreement on the maritime border was that it
will attract the investment in offshore development. Already, Russian scientists have
started a one year mission to explore the natural resources and their recoverability in
the Arctic Ocean.223 In addition, on August 2007, the official newspaper of the
Russian Ministry of Defence Krasnaja zvezda (Red Star) emphasized the importance
of finding a solution to the delimitation disputes with NATO countries. Furthermore,
if the agreement between Norway and Russia was not reached soon, NATO presence
in the region would increase. Undoubtedly, Russia had no interest in providing NATO
with an excuse to preserve its defensive position in the Arctic and views all NATO
activity with suspicion.224
The 2010 Agreement ensured predictability and legal certainty for Norway, as it
finally clarified its maritime boundary within 200 nautical miles off the coast. From
the geopolitical perspective, the agreement proves that Russia is pursuing a new and
softer foreign policy, which concentrates on interests rather than friends or foes, as
seen in the Cold War. The softer foreign policy was also reflected in the previously
analyzed Russian Arctic strategy. Moreover, Russia seeks to improve its image and
investment credentials internationally; these were damaged after the tensions with
Ukraine and Poland regarding the sales of natural gas, as well as the invasion to
Georgia.225 Another factor is energy. Because the agreement was reached, both
countries are now expected to cooperate on a natural resources exploration and
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exploitation program. This will either encourage or mitigate the race for the Arctic
riches.226
The 2010 agreement certainly demonstrated cooperation between the Arctic
states and the commitment to follow the rules of the UNCLOS. It confirmed that the
Law of the Sea applies to the Arctic Ocean. In addition, it proved to be efficient in
solving outstanding maritime issues through bilateral agreements with regards to
geographical factors, without resorting to dispute settlement bodies which rely on
geological and geomorphologic factors.227 Furthermore, the 2010 Agreement
demonstrates a step forward in global governance and sends a strong message to other
nations involved in the maritime boundary disputes.
The Beaufort Sea Dispute
The focuses of this thesis is an ongoing controversy in the southern Arctic – the
Beaufort Sea, where the boundary line between the Canadian territory of Yukon and
the U.S. state of Alaska has not yet been settled. Currently, Canada and the United
States share three maritime boundaries delimitation disputes: the Dixon Entrance, the
Strait of Juan de Fuca, and the Beaufort Sea. The dispute in the Beaufort Sea
encompasses a triangle-shaped area north of Alaska, the Yukon Territory, and the
Northwest Territories which is considered to be the most significant dispute due to the
potential of tremendous natural deposits (Figure 6).228
The Arctic as a whole has been a source of controversy between Canada and the
United States ever since the 1969 Manhattan crisis,229 when the U.S. oil tanker S.S.
Manhattan navigated through the Northwest Passage (NWP) without permission from
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the Canada‟s government. Canada reacted by passing the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act in 1970.230

Figure 6. Border dispute between the United States and Canada in the Beaufort Sea.231

It allowed Canada to claim some legal jurisdiction over the vessels navigating in
the Arctic Archipelago and discouraged tanker transits through the area. However,
only the USSR recognized this right. In 1985, the Polar Sea, the American icebreaker, sailed through the area. This caused tension between both countries.
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The status of the NWP is a serious question in the bilateral relations between the
United States and Canada. The United States claims the international status of the
passage which would give them the right to navigate through it without permission
from Canada. Meanwhile, Canada argues that it belongs to its territorial waters.
However, neither country can enjoy the benefits that the NWP can bring until the
status of the passage is established. Once it is established, the UNCLOS determine
different rights in regards to international and internal waters.
As Arctic Ocean became more navigable, both countries had to defend their
common interests. This encouraged bilateral sectoral initiatives regarding shipping, oil
and gas, and fisheries. In 1974, Canada and the United States agreed on the
establishment of a Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan232 in order to deal with
oil spills and other harmful substances leaked from vessels.233 It provided a
coordinated system for planning, preparing, and responding to the incidents in the
contiguous waters of both states. This Plan also contained an annex regarding the
Beaufort Sea in which the jurisdiction, roles, response procedures were defined.234 In
2003, the Plan‟s operational aspects were updated by a memorandum of
understanding.
In January 11, 1988, Canada and the United States signed an Arctic cooperation
agreement in Ottawa.235 The Agreement was a product of several years of negotiation
and personal contributions by Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan. The
Agreement indicated a pledge by the United States that all navigation by the U.S.
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icebreakers, within waters claimed by Canada, would be internal and could be
performed with the consent of the Canadian government. 236 Moreover, the agreement
allowed for practical cooperation regarding matters related to the NWP, while
affirming that both countries would agree to disagree about the status of the passage.
This Agreement demonstrated a possibility of functional cooperation without settling
legal differences. However, the 1988 Agreement did not eliminate the possibility of
confrontation. It simply postponed it.237
In 1990, both parties signed an agreement that calls for improvement in the
enforcing of fisheries laws and regulations in internal waters, territorial seas, and the
200 miles coastal marine zone.238 However, there still is an absence of bilateral
arrangements for shared fish stocks between the two countries regarding the Beaufort
Sea.239
The United States and Canada’s positions regarding the Beaufort Sea
The core of the current United States - Canada dispute is the line that goes
between the Alaska/Yukon land frontiers into the Beaufort Sea (Figure 6). The dispute
involves two related issues: the interpretation of the language describing the boundary
in the 1825 treaty, and the international rules of continental shelf delimitation and
application. The maritime boundary line is critical for both claimants, as they disagree
as to whether the median line or sector approach should determine the border. The
United States seeks the equidistance principle as a solution to the issue because it
reflects the direction of the coastlines. Moreover, the United States claims itself and
Canada to be bound by the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, and by
customary international law. The United States insists that international law does not
236
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provide detailed description of how the continental shelf should be determined;
therefore, Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf should be applied –
relying on the equitable principle.240 However, Canada objects to it and insists that
equidistance rule does not apply because it is contrary to the UNCLOS provision of
the “special circumstances”.
Canada claims the 141st meridian into the Arctic Ocean. Canada‟s position
stems from the 1825 Boundary Treaty241 between the United Kingdom and The
Russian Empire that sets the 141st meridian line in the Beaufort Sea.242 Canada is the
successor state to the United Kingdom in terms of applicability of this treaty. The
United States, in turn, is in charge of Alaska.243 Canada claims that the 1825 Treaty
provides a boundary which divides both land and sea. The United States questions the
terms used in the treaty and does not accept that it applies to the maritime boundary in
the disputed area.244 Undoubtedly, it will be difficult for Canada to prove that when
the Treaty was negotiated, the negotiations included the delimitation of a maritime
boundary. In addition, Canada‟s position is complicated by the fact that concept of
“territorial sea” was accepted only in 19th century – after the 1825 Treaty was adopted.
Moreover, the particular wording (for example: “as far as the Frozen ocean”) used in
the treaty may not contribute to the Canada‟s position as it has expected.245
The United States has never formally disputed the Canadian use of the 141st
meridian line when exercising jurisdiction in the area. The United States has not
responded to the 1970 Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which aimed
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at claiming the jurisdiction over disputed waters. However, in 1976, reacting to the
Canada‟s claim of a 200 miles fishing zone in the area, the United States declared its
own Beaufort Sea fishing zones that overlapped with Canada‟s claim. Thus, Canada
may argue that in general, U.S. silence meant acceptance.
Canada may also claim a historical usage of the area by Canadian natives (Inuit
population) of the MacKenzie Delta for hunting and living. 246 Nevertheless, the
United States may object to the historical usage by indicating that it is irrelevant to the
issues of the continental shelf, where non-renewable resources are at the center of the
dispute. Historical usage could be more convincing in the disputes over EEZ and the
rights to the fish stocks.247
Both countries agree on adhering to the 1958 Convention on the Continental
Shelf and admit the boundary line to be equitable. However, Canada insists that
median line is not an equitable boundary and would result in a significant benefit to
the United States.248 The notion of “special circumstances,” with particular attention
to the concave coast of Canada, might be an effective argument suitable to Canada‟s
position. The equidistance principle would not ensure proportionality between
Canada‟s coastline and its share of the continental shelf.
The United States objection to Canada‟s position and sector theory can be
explained by the general United States position on the Law of the Sea in the Arctic
Ocean. As was indicated in Chapter I analyzing the U.S. Arctic policy, the United
States favors free and unrestricted mobility in the High North. Therefore, any attempts
to limit its mobility would provoke the United States to reject it. In addition, the
United States does not see any “special circumstances” that can be used in order to
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draw a maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea. Therefore, it claims the equidistance
line to be the most appropriate solution to the issue.
However, Rothwell indicates that reliance on the equidistance principle might
not ensure an equitable solution. It is more common that maritime boundaries are
drawn with a particular respect to the geographic configuration or other special
circumstances, where the median line was applied just in part, adopting it to the
lengths of the coast of the states.249 This has proved to be the case in the Gulf of
Maine250 and in the Barents Sea dispute, where a modified equidistance line was
adopted.
The different interpretation of the 1825 treaty and the ambiguity in its meaning
makes it unlikely to be considered in solving the Beaufort Sea dispute. Even though
the disputed area of approximately 7,000 square nautical miles might look
insignificant, it proves to be crucial in the area, which is rich in natural resources.
The Gulf of Maine case
Given the resource potential of the Beaufort Sea and the history of Canada –
United States disputes in the Arctic, there is no guarantee that the agreement between
the countries can be easily reached. The need for Canada and the United States to
settle maritime boundary delimitation issues is not a unique situation. In 1984, after
fifteen years of negotiations, Canada and the United States settled the boundary
dispute of the Gulf of Maine with the help of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
For the purpose of this paper it is important to mention the Gulf of Maine case
because it illustrates one of the dispute settlement options – reliance on the ICJ.
Moreover, it suggests a strong argument as to why the ICJ may not be an option to
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settle the dispute in the Beaufort Sea. The Gulf of the Maine case is, in a way, similar
to the Beaufort Sea dispute, as the settlement of the boundary has a direct impact on
access to the region‟s natural resources.251 In the Gulf of Maine case, the issue at stake
was renewable natural resources – fish stocks. In the Beaufort Sea dispute, nonrenewable resources such as gas and oil are at the center of the conflict.
The ICJ decision was based on both coastal and political geographical factors to
ensure the equitable result. Nevertheless, both countries, especially their fishing
industries, remain dissatisfied with the Court‟s decision. The Gulf of Maine case and
the dissatisfaction that was caused by the ICJ decision indicate an important point for
both countries, and that is they should try to reach a mutually acceptable agreement
without relying on an independent adjudicative body. When the negotiations fail and
parties decide to settle disputes with the help of others, they have to be aware of
dangers that may arise. Independent bodies, such as the ICJ, rely on the law, and some
important factors indicated by both parties might be interpreted as irrelevant and
rejected. Thus, the final decision might be completely adverse to the interests of one
or both countries involved in the dispute.252 Therefore, the case of the Gulf of Maine
emphasized that parties must carefully weigh the risks and benefits before letting a
third party settle a dispute.
Recent developments regarding the Beaufort Sea
Even though serious conflicts over jurisdiction of the disputed territory in the
Beaufort Sea have been avoided, it seems inevitable that tensions will arise due to
overlapping exploration permits. Interestingly, the United States had leased areas of
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terrain below the water in order to search for and possibly exploit natural resources.253
Canada immediately responded with a diplomatic protest. In August 20, 2009, the
U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Gary Locke, announced an Arctic Fishery Management
Plan, which bans commercial fishing in the warming Arctic.254 This included disputed
waters in the Beaufort Sea. Canada quickly reacted with a diplomatic protest over the
United States unilateral imposition of a fishing ban in the disputed area.255
Based on this, the question arises, “why countries that maintain diplomatic
relations still struggle to resolve the dispute in the Beaufort Sea?” This is a
complicated issue, and one of the complicating factors is the constitutionally
protected, 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement, which is based on Canada‟s perception of
the maritime boundary.256 Baker indicates that both parties perceive this dispute as
well-managed and do not see competing claims in this area as extremely contentious.
Moreover, neither Canada nor the United States expressed interest towards joint
management of the area. In addition, both countries have agreed on a moratorium on
hydrocarbon exploration in the Beaufort triangle.257 This indicates willingness to
cooperate.
Despite overlapping claims in the Beaufort Sea, scientists from Canada and the
United States initiated a joint geological survey that will include the disputed area.
The purpose of the joint mission is data gathering for national submissions to the
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Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.258 The bi-national study of the
area and data gathering are necessary for both delineation of the continental shelf and
eventual resolution of the maritime boundary dispute in the Beaufort Sea.259
Baker indicates that the method used by Canada and the United States is joint
seabed mapping, and scientific cooperation, in accordance with international law and
international institutions, can be applied to the dispute in the Beaufort Sea. He further
claims that cooperation in gathering and expanding the data about the region is
valuable.260 Both countries have shared an interest; however they cannot reach a
consensus on the maritime boundaries. Joint efforts to explore the region can
strengthen Canadian and U.S.

national security, economic

potential, and

environmental protection. Both countries should be interested in better exploration of
the resources in the sea, thus, dividing responsibilities and benefits that the exploration
and protection can bring. Moreover, it would provide an excellent example of how
national legal systems can improve the governance and regulation of the Arctic by
relying on the interplay between law, policy, science, and technology. 261 Intelligent
political decisions should be based on a scientific foundation in order to define the
standards, implement, and enforce them.
This thesis claims that the time is ripe for the renewal of the diplomatic
discussions regarding the settlement of the Beaufort Sea dispute. In July 2010, experts
from both countries entered into negotiations in Ottawa with the approval of Canada‟s
Foreign Affairs Minister, Lawrence Cannon, and the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton. The second meeting was planned to be held in Washington, in 2011.262
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In February 4, 2011, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and U.S. President Barack
Obama officially announced continental partnership negotiations. The aim of the
negotiations is to establish bi-national security and trade perimeters.263 Both parties
admitted divergent views on certain measures, but were determined to seek balance.
No timetable to reach a deal was announced. Moreover, Harper and Obama
“…recognized the sovereign right of each country to act independently in its own
interest.”264 Negotiations on the security perimeter are also to include the challenges
that both countries face in the Arctic waters.265
Analysis: possible Beaufort Sea dispute settlement solutions
It is common in maritime boundary disputes for both parties to advocate the use
of completely different methods regarding division of the area. It complicates the
dispute settlement process, as both parties are unwilling to accept each other‟s
proposals. Therefore, a need for alternative delimitation criteria arises. This thesis
claims that the United States and Canada would benefit the most by settling the
dispute bilaterally. The case of the Gulf of the Maine proved that relying on the third
party to resolve the dispute can result in an outcome that is not totally satisfactory for
either party. Taking into consideration the uncertainty about the techniques that the
ICJ or an arbitrator might use in dividing a resource rich area, it is highly unlikely that
both parties would leave the final say on the Beaufort Sea boundary to an adjudication
process. As a result, the United States and Canada should analyze the negotiations that
led Russia and Norway to cooperate and finally sign an agreement. Parties have to
realize that without making concessions, it is impossible to reap benefits. A flexible
263
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approach and concessions made by both countries are needed when the issue of the
natural resources is at stake.
One possible solution to end the dispute is to adopt a modified equidistance line,
which will be based on a “median line” but adjusted so that an equitable result would
be reached.266 It would acknowledge both parties‟ claims: the equidistance line
favored by the United States and the nature of Canada‟s coastline as a “special
circumstance” preferred by Canada. Both countries will be neither clear beneficiaries
nor significant losers. This type of delimitation was used solving the Barents Sea
dispute, where both parties were granted approximately equal areas.
The “joint development” concept may also be an option. Claimant countries
would jointly explore, exploit, and have shared jurisdiction over adjacent borders.267
This solution would allow both countries to share benefits equally and explore the
region more systematically. Later this may lead to the final delimitation boundary as
the resources deposits are explored, and mined. This option is mostly considered in
the disputes involving natural resources, because in such cases parties to the dispute
tend to be less flexible in defining the border line.268 Canada and the United States
have a similar culture and legal system; therefore, the option of joint exploration and
exploitation might work for them. As was indicated before, Canada and the United
States have already started a joint mission aiming at exploration. If both parties find
this option acceptable, there would be several issues that will need to be resolved.269
The parties will need to negotiate the boundary of the joint-development zone, define
how the mining will be undertaken, and how it will be administered? Moreover, the
issues of funding and profits or minerals division will need to be addressed. There
266
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might be some disagreements and tensions, but a step forward on cooperation would
already have been taken.
One more option available for the Beaufort Sea might be a “common petroleum
deposits regime.”270 It would deal with the issue of resource exploitation in the areas
where parties to the dispute find it complicated to reach an agreement on the maritime
boundary. Thus, the issue of sovereignty over the disputed seabed is avoided, as a
single operator would be exploiting the area and distributing benefits for all parties in
the dispute. Hence, similar issues, as indicated in the joint-development zone regime,
will arise and will need to be settled. However, taking into consideration the fact that
the precise amount of the resources is not available, the option of a common
petroleum deposits regime would be difficult to implement.
This thesis states that if countries are interested in preserving their interests and
positions by deciding upon the future border of the Beaufort Sea, bilateral negotiations
are the best option. The Barents Sea case demonstrated that satisfactory results can be
enjoyed only through comprehensive negotiations that consider both parties‟
preferences. As was indicated by both parties‟ Arctic strategies, willingness to
cooperate, while defending their national interest, may be the key to the negotiations
that would benefit both their individual and regional goals. Drawing a clear maritime
border line, will promote and ensure stability in the Arctic region. In addition, it
would oppose realists‟ claims that the benefits of cooperation can be easily overcome
by each country‟s desire to preserve its presence and dominance in the region.

270

Ibid., 49-51.

78

Chapter V: Conclusion
The Arctic can no more be described as a peripheral region that is absent from
the international agenda. The region has become economically attractive as a result of
accessibility, exploration and possible exploitation of the Arctic‟s riches such as oil,
natural gas, fish stocks, and minerals. The Arctic countries have become greatly
involved in the region‟s geopolitics. The predicted prosperity of the Arctic has
propelled countries to compete over territory and natural resources lying beneath the
water.
In the current study I analyzed whether countries in the Arctic are prone to
cooperation or conflict. There is no doubt that a huge amount of potential natural
resources in the disputed areas can cause significant tensions between the countries.
As the current oil reserves are rapidly depleting, the potential for conflict and tensions
arise. On the other hand, we live in the increasingly interdependent world, where
cooperation is not an option, but rather an obligation. Moreover, none of the claimants
to Arctic resources can be absolutely sure that there are sufficient resources lying in
the disputed areas that are worth fighting over. Thus, further exploration of the area is
crucial to reveal the potential lying under the water.
In order to evaluate the cooperation or confrontation dilemma, it was important
to draw attention to the Arctic strategy documents issued by all Arctic states, and
analyze the message they conveyed. Even though the documents reflect each
country‟s determination to protect their sovereignty and interest in the Arctic, they
indicate a willingness and necessity to cooperate.
Moreover, this thesis analyzed the significance of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and whether or not it facilitates
cooperation between the countries in the region. The Arctic States are spending
79

considerable amounts of money trying to obtain the necessary evidence to prove the
extension of their continental shelf. The melting ice, accessibility to the natural
resources, and availability of advanced technology contribute to the proliferation of
new boundary issues between the states which require delimitation. All these factors
also made many potential boundaries more important to the states concerned.
Economic opportunities brought new perceptions to the current disputes involving
sovereignty rights in the Arctic. Regarding delimitation of the disputed waters, the
UNCLOS only indicates a necessity to reach an equitable solution without giving
concrete measures as to how the final maritime boundaries should be settled.
Next, I analyzed the Barents Sea dispute that lasted for four decades. In
particular, I intended to examine how Russia and Norway found a means to cooperate
and eventually sign an agreement. This thesis claims that lessons learned from the
negotiations and peaceful settlement of the Barents Sea dispute between Russia and
Norway should have a positive influence on the Beaufort Sea dispute between Canada
and the United States.
Some possible solutions for the Beaufort Sea dispute were analyzed, and it was
found that the most suitable option is to adopt the modified equidistance line
approach, which would indicate neither a huge loss nor a significant gain to any of the
parties involved. This delimitation concept also proved to be successful in settling the
Barents Sea dispute. Another possible solution is the “joint development” concept,
which leaves the sovereignty issue aside and is based on mutual exploration and
exploitation of the resources. Canada and the United States have a history of
cooperation – NATO, 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement, and Arctic Council –
which indicates that there is a good possibility of settling the dispute, although it is
impossible without concessions from both parties involved.
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In the Arctic, the uncertainty about the exact amount of resources and the issue
of recoverability will prevent the countries from confronting each other. However, as
long as final dividing lines have not been drawn and accepted, the potential for
conflict remains. In addition, the proper exploration and exploitation of the resources
is not possible until the agreements between the countries are reached and the
territories are divided or shared. It is evident that countries, especially the United
State, are becoming increasingly interested in the access of secure energy in their
territory, particularly given the instability caused by the “Arab Spring” of 2011. The
uncertain current situation and continued United States dependence on imported oil
might stimulate some concessions that would bring parties closer to a solution to the
Beaufort Sea conflict.
I believe that the Arctic region can bring states together to confront shared
challenges, solve common problems, and enjoy the benefits that the improved access
to the region‟s resources will bring. The positive lessons learned from the experience
of other nations should be analyzed, understood, and applied to the ongoing disputes.
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